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We consider an exchange economy under uncertainty, in which agents’ utility functions
exhibit constant absolute risk aversion, but they may be recursive and the expected utility
calculation may be based on multiple subjective beliefs. The risk aversion coeﬃcients,
subjective beliefs, subjective time discount factors, initial endowments, and tradeable assets
may diﬀer across agents. We prove that the risk-free bond price goes down (and the interest
rate goes up) monotonically as the markets become more complete. We ﬁnd the range of
equilibrium bond prices that depends on the primitives of the economy but not on the
structures of ﬁnancial markets.
JEL Classiﬁcation Codes: D52, D91, E21, E44, G12.
Keywords: The risk-free rate puzzle, constant absolute risk aversion, incomplete mar-
kets, general equilibrium, multiple priors.1 Introduction
1.1 Setup and Results
In this paper, we consider a model of an exchange economy under uncertainty with two
consumption periods and one physical good, where consumption smoothing over time and
uncertainty is done by asset transactions in ﬁnancial markets. We are interested in how
market incompleteness aﬀects the price for the risk-free (real or indexed) discount bond,
which pays one unit of the physical commodity in every state of the second period in this
setup.
The setup of the model is very general. Markets may be incomplete, so that not all
risks are hedgeable, that is, can be hedged through asset transactions. In particular, initial
endowments may not be hedgeable. We also allow diﬀerent agents to have access to diﬀerent
assets markets. For the preferences of agents, we require that the utility from consumption
in each period be given by a utility function exhibiting constant absolute risk aversion
(CARA for short), but otherwise the dynamic utility function has a general recursive from
with possibly multiple priors. Agents’ preferences are heterogenous.
The ﬁrst contribution of the paper is to prove that when the asset markets become more
complete, in the sense that every agent can access more markets, then the bond price never
goes up (Theorem 5). Moreover, it must go down if some agent’s consumption plan changes.
In other words, the interest rate increases as the market incompleteness diminishes. The
result is reported in Section 3.
This result implies that the bond price is highest when the markets are least complete
(where the risk-free bond is the only tradeable asset) and it is lowest when the markets
are fully complete (where all risk are marketable). Thus we can derive theoretical bounds
for the equilibrium bond prices independent of the market structure by studying these two
extreme hypothetical cases: we do not need to know what kind of risky assets are available
for trade in the economy. In Section 4, we ﬁrst identify a theoretical upper bound for
equilibrium bond prices of the economy in question (Proposition 9). For the case of single
common prior, with some additional assumptions, we also ﬁnd a lower bound, and hence
a range of theoretical bond prices (Propositions 12 and 13). These results constitute the
second contribution of the paper.
11.2 The Preferences
It may ﬁrst appear that the assumption of a CARA utility function is unduly restrictive.
But as the matter of fact, our model admits a very general class of two period utility
functions across the agents. First, the utility function may have the recursive form, so
that the attitude towards intertemporal substitution can be disentangled from the attitude
towards risk taking.
Secondly, the agent may have multiple subjective probability measures over the state
space, so the attitude towards subjective uncertainty can be discussed in addition to the
risk attitudes. More speciﬁcally, an agent’s utility level is given as the minimum of the
expected utility levels with respect to all such subjective probability measures, so that he
behaves in the maximin manner when choosing a consumption plan.
In symbols, we consider the class of utility functions U over two-period consumptions
of the form









where x0 denotes the consumption level on period 0 (the ﬁrst period); x denotes the random
variable representing the consumption on period 1 (the second period); v is the negatively
exponential function representing the attitude towards intertemporal substitution; u is the
negatively exponential function representing the attitude towards risk taking; δ is the sub-
jective time discount factor; Π is the set of subjective probability measures; and Eπ is the
expectation operator with respect to the probability measure π. Of course, the requirement
on the form of v and u above is our CARA assumption.
Not only the individual utility function is very general as above, but also a great deal of
heterogeneity in agents’ utility functions is allowed in our model. Indeed, all the constituents
for the utility function U, which are u, v, δ, and Π, may vary across agents.
1.3 Signiﬁcance of the Results
First, our results are important contributions to the extensive literature on the risk-free rate
puzzle, identiﬁed by Weil (1989) and later surveyed in, for example, Kocherlakota (1996): in
the US ﬁnancial markets for about a century until the 1980s, the observed risk-free interest
rates have been far lower than the rates a representative agent model with reasonable
parameter values could explain. As Weil (1992) subsequently pursued, we also ask the
2question of to what extent the market incompleteness and agent heterogeneity can possibly
explain the observed low risk-free interest rates in a general equilibrium model. Our analysis
also takes into account the eﬀects from time non-separability of preferences and multiple
priors. The results in this paper are therefore very general answers to this question. In
particular, the upper bound result (Proposition 9) identiﬁes the limit of explanatory power
of time non-separability and multiple priors as well as the market incompleteness.
Secondly, their implications to the ﬁnancial innovation literature are valuable. How the
prices of existing assets are aﬀected by ﬁnancial innovations, such as introduction of new
derivative assets, reduction in transaction fees, and abolition of short sales constraints? Our
results answer this question for the risk-free bond. It is known that this question is diﬃcult
to answer in general. The issue is complicated because of the pecuniary externalities arising
from changes in prices for existing assets. Obviously, these must be taken into account
when evaluating the overall welfare consequences of ﬁnancial innovations.
Although our results constitute only a partial answer since they do not describe the
other assets, for certain cases they are enough to identify the pecuniary externalities, and
thus they give a complete answer to the welfare issues. Indeed, it is known that in a class
of single common prior normal payoﬀs models with CARA expected utility, the prices for
risky assets are not aﬀected by the introduction of new assets.1 Hence the overall welfare
consequence can be identiﬁed once the changes in bond prices are known as our results
indicate.2
Finally, one should not overlook the advantage of this paper over some recent contri-
butions in the so called general equilibrium theory with incomplete asset markets (GEI)
with numerical analyses: while this paper is able to look into detailed pricing implications,
it does not appeal to any numerical analysis restricted to speciﬁc cases of incomplete mar-
kets. While we readily admit that the scope of the analysis is still limited, it deepens our
understanding far beyond numerical analyses can oﬀer, and therefore it suggests a new line
1 To be precise, all agents conform the expected utility hypothesis with CARA utility (that is, u = v
in (1)), and share the same, single, probabilistic belief over the state space and the same subjective time
discount factor, and if the risk factors deﬁning the assets’ payoﬀs and agents’ endowments are assumed to
be normally distributed. The result is contained in Oh (1996) and his predecessors referred to therein.
2 To be exact, we need to assume that the payoﬀs of the risky assets have zero mean for this conclusion,
because otherwise the change in the risk-free interest rate would aﬀect relative prices of risky assets according
to how large their means are.
3of research on GEI.
1.4 Related Literature
Weil (1992, Proposition 1) showed that the bond price is lower in fully complete markets
than in the least complete markets. The intermediate cases, where the markets are neither
fully nor least complete, are indeed diﬃcult to analyze, due to the general equilibrium eﬀects
among multiple asset markets and ineﬃciency of equilibrium allocations; and it would cast
serious doubts on the relevance of his result if the direction of changes in the bond prices
could be reversed in some intermediate cases. Yet the monotonicity result of this paper
shows that such reversion never occurs. We can thus say that our result conﬁrms the
robustness of his result.
Our result generalizes Proposition 1 of Elul (1997), in that we do not use any of the
four conditions he needed to derive the same result. The recursive utility functions were
introduced in Kreps and Porteus (1978). The case of constant elasticity of substitution was
subsequently presented by Epstein and Zin (1989), and recursive utility functions of CARA
type were used in Calvet, Gonzalez-Eiras, and Sodini (2001). Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989)
considered the problem of when attitudes towards risk and uncertainty can be represented
as the minimum of expected utility levels with respect to multiple subjective probabilities
over the state space. To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the ﬁrst one to explore
implications on asset prices of heterogenous agents with recursive utility functions and
multiple subjective probability beliefs, let alone being the ﬁrst one to predict (correctly!)
possible directions of changes in asset prices when more assets become tradeable.
A model of restricted participation was considered by Balasko, Cass, and Siconolﬁ
(1990), where diﬀerent agents may trade diﬀerent types of assets. The types of trade
restrictions we assume in this paper are more general than theirs. In particular, short-sales
constraints and nonlinear constraints can be accommodated. Although the restrictions on
asset trades are exogenously given for each agent in our and their models, agents may
choose to trade more varieties of risky assets upon paying entry costs in the model of Cal-
vet, Gonzalez-Eiras, and Sodini (2001); and they point to the possibility (Proposition 4)
that ﬁnancial innovations may cause the bond price to go up due to the endogenous market
participation.
In a model of a continuous-time stochastic world economy of two countries having the
4log expected utility functions, Devereux and Saito (1997) considered three structures of
international capital markets: Autarchy, in which no trade between the two countries is at
all possible; fully complete markets, in which both the short-term risk-free bond and the
shares in each country’s production technologies can be traded between the two countries;
and the bond trade regime, in which only the short-term risk-free bond can be traded.
They identiﬁed a parameter region (inequality (18) on page 471) over which one country
may get worse oﬀ as the market structure moves from the bond trade regime to the complete
markets. The reduction in this country’s welfare can be attributed to the negative pecuniary
externality arising from changes in the bond price, which dominates the beneﬁt of enhanced
risk-hedging (diversiﬁcation) opportunities.
2 The Model
2.1 State Space and Commodity Space
There are two consumption periods, 0 and 1, and there is a single perishable good in each
period. There is no uncertainty in period 0, when the consumption good and assets are
exchanged. At the beginning of period 1, the assets pay oﬀ and consumption then takes
place. The uncertainty in period 1 is described by a ﬁnite state space Ω. We often refer to
each function from Ω to R as a random variable. Denote by 1 the function from Ω to R
that takes constant value one. The constant variable 1 will be interpreted as the risk-free
discount bond. Let X be the set of all random variables. We take the commodity space to
be R×X. A generic element of R×X will be denoted by (x0,x), where x0 corresponds to
consumption in period 0, and x is a random variable that corresponds to consumption in
period 1, and we write x(ω) for consumption in state ω.
2.2 Primitives
There are H agents in the economy. Each agent, indexed h ∈ {1,...,H}, is characterized
by:
• Set Πh of subjective probability measures putting a strictly positive probability on
every state. We assume that Πh is non-empty and compact when regarded as a
subset of R|Ω|. The expectation operator for each π ∈ Πh is denoted by Eπ; Eπ (x) :=
5 
ω∈Ω x(ω)π (ω). The minimum expectation operator EΠh
is deﬁned by EΠh
(z) =
min
π∈Πh Eπ(z) for every z ∈ X, which is well deﬁned by the compactness.
• Atemporal von Neumann Morgenstern utility function uh and intertemporal util-










• Subjective time discount factor δh > 0.
• Initial endowment vector (eh
0,eh) ∈ R × X.




















is the certainty equivalent of xh with respect to the minimum expectation














   
. (3)
This is a combination of a modiﬁcation of recursive utility functions investigated in Kreps
and Porteus (1978) and multiple probability measures of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989). The
class of the expected utility functions is given by letting uh = vh and Πh be a singleton;












The reciprocal 1/βh of the absolute risk aversion represents the agent’s tolerance for in-
tertemporal substitution and is denoted by γh.
3A special case of these utility functions has been used in Calvet, Gonzales-Eiraz, and Sodini (2001), in
which all consumers have the same atemporal utility function, the same intertemporal utility function, the
same unique subjective probability, and the same subjective discount factor, and the risky asset payoﬀs and
initial endowments are jointly normally distributed. We shall not impose any of these additional assumptions.
4Thus even when all the Π
h are singletons, our model is one of heterogenous beliefs, extensively investi-
gated by Calvet, Grandmont, and Lemaire (1999).
62.3 Market Structures
To investigate the implications of the structure of markets on the equilibrium prices, we
shall consider various market structures. A market structure is determined by a collection
of assets and a proﬁle of permissible portfolios for the H agents in the economy, as follows.
Each asset is characterized by its payoﬀ in period 1 and hence identiﬁed with an element
of X. There are ﬁnitely many assets, a1,...,aJ, where J ≥ 1 and aj ∈ X for every j, and a
generic collection of assets is denoted by A = (a1,...,aJ) ∈ XJ. It is assumed that a1 = 1
throughout the paper. This means that the risk-free bond can be traded in all the setups
we shall consider. In particular, if J = 1, then the risk-free bond is the only traded asset.
A household may not access freely to certain markets. To formalize this, for each agent
h, we denote by Nh ⊂ RJ the nonempty set of all portfolios of the J assets that agent h
can hold. We assume that there is no restriction for the market of risk-free bond. Formally,







∈ Nh and ˆ yh








Note in particular that there is no borrowing or lending constraint in terms of the risk-free
bond.
The following examples should clarify what Nh is intended to capture: If Nh = RJ,
then agent h can trade all assets available in the ﬁnancial markets; if Nh = R×{0}, where
0 ∈ RJ−1, then, among the J traded assets, agent h can trade the risk-free bond but nothing
else; and if Nh = R × RJ−1
+ , then agent h can trade any (positive or negative) amount of
the risk-free bond, but cannot short sell the other assets. It is of course possible to have
the mixture of the last two for various assets other than the risk-free bond. The bound on




2 = ··· = yh
J}, then agent h is constrained to hold equal quantities of the other
assets. We may view the combination of these J −1 assets as a mutual fund and agent h as
constrained to trade the risk-free bond and the mutual fund, but not the constituent assets.
Note that we do not require that the assets are linearly independent, and hence there
may be redundant assets. The reader will see that the existence of redundant assets does
not matter in our analysis since we will be interested in the bond price only. Note however
that even if an asset is a linear combination of other assets, it is not necessarily redundant
in our setup because of the trading restriction.
If J = 1, then only the risk-free bond is traded and the markets are least complete.
7On the other hand, if for every (zh)h∈{1,...,H} with zh ∈ X and
H  
h=1
zh = 0, there exists a
(yh)h∈{1,...,H} with yh ∈ Nh and
H  
h=1




j aj for every h, then the
market structure is fully complete.
To sum up, a market structure of the economy is given by a collection (A,N1,...,NH),
where, for some positive integer J, A ∈ XJ and Nh ⊆ RJ for each h, satisfying the condition
regarding the risk-free bond trade. As the purpose of this paper is to investigate how the
bond price is aﬀected by the nature of market structures, we do not assume that eh is




j aj = 0.
2.4 Utility Maximization and Equilibrium
Given a collection A ∈ XJ of J assets, an asset price vector is denoted by q = (q1,...,qJ) ∈
RJ, where qj is the price for the j-th asset. Since there is no restriction on the payoﬀs except
for the bond, the price may be negative. Every agent h is assumed to be a price taker and
his portfolio choice is constrained by the set Nh. Thus his utility maximization problem


















The ﬁrst constraint is the budget constraint for the current consumption and asset trades
in period 0. The consumption in period 0 is assumed to be the num´ eraire, whose price
equals one. Since it is desirable, the inequality may be replaced with equality. Given that
there is no re-trade in period 1, the second constraint simply says that the consumption in
that period is derived from the initial endowments and the payoﬀs from the assets in the
portfolio. The third constraint is on the portfolio choice in period 0, as formulated in the
previous subsection. Notice that the agent takes the set of feasible portfolios, Nh as given,
8as in Balasko, Cass, and Siconolﬁ (1990).5
An asset price vector q and an allocation ((xh
0,xh,yh))h∈{1,...,H} of consumptions and
portfolios constitute an equilibrium of the economy for the market structure (A,N1,...,NH)
if, for every h, (xh




This equality is the asset market clearing condition, but it implies that the good markets
clear as well.
Since we do not impose any restriction on the market structure except for the bond, an
equilibrium may not exist. It does exist when there is no individual trading constraint, but
this is of course not the only case for existence. Since our results hold whenever there is an
equilibrium, we chose not to impose extra restrictions on the market structure a priori.
It is known, and can be shown easily, that any equilibrium allocation is constrained
Pareto eﬃcient in the sense that no welfare improving reallocation of assets respecting the
individual portfolio choice set Nh.6 It is fully Pareto eﬃcient if (A,N1,...,NH) is a fully
complete market structure.
Note that our equilibrium concept is ex ante. If there is a single prior for each agent, ex
ante optimal decision implies ex post optimal decision thanks to the recursive structure of
the preferences. But for multiple priors, since updating of multiple priors is non trivial, an
ex ante optimal decision may involve some ex post suboptimal behavior. Thus the agent
may want to re-trade once period one markets open, hence the trade an ex ante equilibrium
describes may not be an ex post equilibrium. The issue of dynamic consistency with multiple
priors is important but it is beyond the scope of this paper.7
Note ﬁnally that the equilibrium price of the risk-free discount bond is q1 and the
equilibrium risk-free interest rate is 1/q1 − 1. Hence a higher bond price means a lower
interest rate, and vice versa.
5Calvet, Gonzalez-Eiras, and Sodini (2001) investigated the case where he may choose to expand N
h at
some costs.
6This can be proved along the lines of the proof of Theorem 12.3 of Magill and Quinzii (1996).
7Epstein and Schneider (2003) and Wakai (2003) identiﬁed a condition on the set of priors which implies
dynamically consistent behavior.
93 Monotonicity of the Equilibrium Bond Prices
A special character of a CARA utility function is that its logarithmic transformation is
quasi-linear in the direction of (1,1), even with multiple subjective beliefs. Formally, for
each h, deﬁne Wh : R×X → R by Wh(xh
0,xh) = −γh log(−Uh(xh
0,xh)). This is well deﬁned
because Uh(xh
0,xh) < 0 and it represents the same preference as Uh because the function
U  → −γh log(−U) is strictly increasing.


































Applying this to (2) we see that Uh(xh
0 + t,xh + t1) = exp(−βht)Uh(xh
0,xh), and hence
Wh(x0 + t,xh + t1) = Wh(xh
0,xh) + t.
Remark 2 The relation (6) says that the probability measures in Πh that attain the min-
imum expected utility in the deﬁnition of the minimum expectation operator EΠh
are in-
variant to additions of the risk-free bond. So although Uh is not a diﬀerentiable function on
R×X because of the minimum operator, it is diﬀerentiable in the direction of the risk-free
bond. These properties do not generally hold for risky assets.
Remark 3 Let L be a linear subspace of R × X that does not contain (1,1) and, along
with it, spans the entire R×X. Let   W : L → R be the restriction of W onto L. Then   W is a



























Hence W can be decomposed into a strictly concave part and a linear part.
10To state the main result of this paper, we introduce the at-least-as-complete-as relation
between two market structures.
Deﬁnition 4 Let (A,N1,...,NH) and (ˆ A, ˆ N1,..., ˆ NH) be two market structures, with
A = (a1,...,aJ) and ˆ A =
 
ˆ a1,...,ˆ a ˆ J
 
. Then (A,N1,...,NH) is at least as complete
as (ˆ A, ˆ N1,..., ˆ NH) if the following condition is satisﬁed: If ˆ yh ∈ ˆ Nh for every h and
  ˆ J




  ˆ J
j=1 ˆ yh
j ˆ aj
for every h and
 J
j=1 yh = 0.
According to this deﬁnition, a market structure is at least as complete as another if
every risk allocation attained via the second market structure can also be attained via the




  ˆ J
j=1 ˆ yh
j ˆ aj and the market clearing condition
 J
j=1 yh = 0. If all the Nh were equal and
linear, the market clearing condition would be superﬂuous for the subsequent analysis.
Otherwise, the individual spanning condition does not automatically imply the market
clearing condition, and hence it is necessary to impose this condition in addition to the
individual spanning condition.
It is easy to see that if we add a new asset without shrinking the portfolio choice sets
for the existing assets, then the resultant market structure is at least as complete as the
original one. Hence the case of J = 1, in which only the risk-free asset is traded, is the
case of the least complete markets. Even if we do not add any new asset, if expand some
agent’s portfolio choice set without shrinking the others’, the resultant market structure is
again at least as complete as the original one. However, the resultant market structure may
well be at least as complete as the original one even when we replace some existing assets
by new ones. In particular, a market structure is at least as complete as any other market
structure if and only if it gives rise to the fully complete markets.
The following theorem is the main result of this paper.
Theorem 5 Let (A,N1,...,NH) and (ˆ A, ˆ N1,..., ˆ NH) be two market structures, with
equilibrium risk-free bond prices q1 and ˆ q1, such that (A,N1,...,NH) is at least as complete
as (ˆ A, ˆ N1,..., ˆ NH). Then q1 ≤ ˆ q1.
This theorem claims that if a market structure is at least as complete as another, then
the risk-free bond price in the ﬁrst market structure cannot be higher than the risk-free
11bond price in the second. A less general version of this result was originally proved in Hara
(1998). The theorem also generalizes Proposition 1 of Elul (1997), Theorem 3 of Calvet
(2001) when restricted to the two-period case, and Theorem 5 of Calvet, Gonzalez-Eiras,
and Sodini (2001).
Proof. Let ((xh
0,xh,yh))h∈{1,...,H} be an allocation corresponding to the equilibrium bond
price q1. By equality (7), for every h, the directional derivative of Uh in the direction
of (0,1) at (xh





. The directional derivative in the




. Also, there is no constraint on the transaction
of the risk-free bond (asset 1). Hence utility maximization implies that the following the











  . (8)


















































= −γh log(1 + q1) + xh
0.

















0,ˆ xh, ˆ yh))h∈{1,...,H} for an allocation corresponding to the equilibrium bond price









12By Lemma 1, every Wh is quasi-linear in (1,1) ∈ R × N. Moreover, every equilibrium
allocation is constrained Pareto eﬃcient. Thus the allocation ((xh
0,xh,yh))h∈{1,...,H} must












j aj for every h,





Since (A,N1,...,NH) is at least as complete as (ˆ A, ˆ N1,..., ˆ NH), there exists an alloca-
tion (  yh)h∈{1,...,H} of portfolios for (A,N1,...,NH) such that   yh ∈ Nh and
 J
j=1   yh
j aj =
  ˆ J
j=1 ˆ yh
j ˆ aj for every h, and
 H
h=1   yh = 0. Then ((ˆ xh
0,ˆ xh,   yh))h∈{1,...,H} satisﬁes the con-









Thus, by (9) and (10),









Hence q1 ≤ ˆ q1.
Remark 6 By taking Nh = RJ and Nh = R
ˆ J for every h, we can see from Theorem 5 that
as the market span increases, the equilibrium bond price decreases.
Remark 7 As seen in Remark 3, Wh is quasi linear in (1,1) with a strictly concave non-
linear component. Thus, if Nh is convex for every h, then the solution to (11) is unique up
to transfers in the direction of in (1,1). This means that the inequality (12) must be strict
if at least one agent consume diﬀerently in the two equilibria, and so q1 < ˆ q1.
Let us give some intuition for the result: With one good but no sequential trades, the
equilibrium allocations are constrained Pareto eﬃcient with respect to the given market
structure. By the quasi-linearity of the Wh in (1,1) and absence of trade constraints on
the risk-free bond, eﬃciency can be reduced to total welfare maximization. An increase in
trading opportunity must increase the total welfare. On the other hand, the total welfare can
be directly measured in terms the bond price since the uh and vh are exponential functions;
13roughly speaking, the price is the same as the marginal utility of risk-free consumption, and
the marginal utility works in the same way (but in the opposite direction) as the utility for
these functions. So the equilibrium total welfare can be written as a decreasing function of
the bond price. Therefore, an increase in the value of the utilitarian social welfare function
corresponds to a decrease in bond prices.
Remark 8 Suppose now that the economy were not a pure exchange one but were to involve
some ﬁrms, whose production technologies are of the multiplicative type as in Diamond
(1967). Then, in spite of market incompleteness, the proﬁt maximization is a well deﬁned
objective and the equilibrium allocations are constrained Pareto eﬃcient. The proof of
Theorem 5, however, would not fully go through: The second equality of (9) no longer
holds and equality (12) must be replaced by

















0, that is, the ag-
gregate consumption in period 1 is not increased. In other words, if the ﬁnancial innovation
induces the ﬁrms to expand their scales of operation, possibly by selling (issuing) the bond,
then the bond price must go down and the interest rate must go up. This is a nice, intuitive
extension of Theorem 5 to production economies.
Finally, Theorem 5 should not be confused but contrasted with the invariance property
of risky asset prices established by Oh (1996) and his predecessors, the property that with
CARA utility functions and normally distributed asset payoﬀs, the relative prices among
risky assets do not depend on the market span.8
4 Range of the Equilibrium Bond Prices
Theorem 5 implies that the equilibrium risk-free bond price is lowest when the market
structure is fully complete, and it is highest when the market structure is least complete,
that is, only the risk-free bond is traded. In order to ﬁnd the upper and lower bounds on the
bond prices independently of market structures, therefore, it is suﬃcient to identify those
prices in the least complete markets and the fully complete markets.
8Footnotes 1 and 2 contain more details on this property.
14We ﬁrst study the case where the risk-free bond is the only tradeable asset. We have
a clean, closed form expression for the equilibrium price, which then identiﬁes the highest
bond price thus the lowest interest rate.
Proposition 9 Let q1 be an equilibrium risk-free bond price for the least complete market
















and 1/β = 1/β1 + ··· + 1/βH. The expression (13) gives
the largest bond price independent of the market structure.
The ﬁrst part can be shown by directly checking the ﬁrst order condition, and a proof
is given in Appendix. The second part follows from Theorem 5.
Now let us consider the case of the fully complete market structures. This case is harder
to identify in our general setup of the recursivity and heterogeneity of subjective sets of
probabilities. A short explanation for this is that there is no representative agent. Hence
we shall concentrate on an environment which admits a representative agent. Formally, we
use the following assumption.
Assumption 10 1.
α1
β1 = ··· =
αH
βH .
2. There exists a probability measure π such that Π1 = ··· = ΠH = {π}.
The ﬁrst condition is that the ratio between αh and βh is common over all agents. Notice
that this condition still allows for heterogenous, truly recursive utility functions since α’s
and β’s need not be common. The second condition is the common prior assumption.9 Note
that there is no restriction on subjective discount factors, thus in particular they can be
heterogeneous.
Under Assumption 10, a mutual fund theorem type argument applies. Deﬁne α, β, δ,
9The heterogeneous subjective probabilities investigated in Calvet, Grandmont, and Lemaire (1999) and
the multiple subjective probabilities for a single agent investigated in Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) are,
























Deﬁne then u : R → R, v : R → R, and U : R × X → R by u(w) = −exp(−αw),
v(w) = −exp(−βw), and





= −exp(−βx0) − δ (Eπ (exp(−αx)))
β/α . (14)
Let (λh,...,λH) ∈ RH















Note that when setting up this welfare maximization problem, we are implicitly assuming
that the markets are fully complete, as the resource feasibility is the only constraint for this
problem.














































for each h. Then ((xh
0,xh))h∈{1,...,H} is the solution to the problem (15). Moreover, there




0,xh) = λU(x0,x) for every (x0,x) ∈ R × X.
This can be shown by directly computing the ﬁrst order condition; a proof can be found
in Appendix.
The equilibrium bond price can then be derived from Theorem 11.
16Proposition 12 Under Assumption 10, let q1 be an equilibrium risk-free bond price for a






Therefore, under Assumption 10, we can identify the range of equilibrium bond prices
completely. We shall relate it to an index of market incompleteness, as follows.
Proposition 13 Under Assumption 10, for every market structure (A,N1,...,NH), if
q1 is an equilibrium risk-free bond price for (A,N1,...,NH), then there exists a θ in the
interval  
 
   











   











This proposition follows from α/αh = γh/γ for every h under Assumption 10.








is an index measuring the discrepancy of the initial endowment allocation (eh)h∈{1,...,H} from
the Pareto eﬃcient allocations, and hence succinctly summarizing the impact on the price
of the risk-free bond when it is the only traded security. Indeed, according to Theorem
11, (eh)h∈{1,...,H} can constitute a Pareto eﬃcient allocation if and only if there exists a
(η1,...,ηH) ∈ RH such that eh = (γh/γ)e + ηh1 for every h, in which case (19) equals 1;
and, according to Proposition 9, the index measures how much higher the bond prices may
be if the markets are incomplete.
Note ﬁnally that the fraction (19) can be made arbitrarily large. For example, suppose
that the eh are risky and yet there is no aggregate uncertainty, so that
H  
h=1
eh = η1 for some








is not changed but the fraction (19) can be made arbitrarily large by taking σ suﬃciently
17large. In particular, when markets are incomplete, the (real) interest interest rate may be
negative even when it would be positive should the market be complete.
5 Concluding Remarks
In an exchange economy with CARA recursive utility functions and multiple subjective
beliefs, we showed that the risk-free bond price goes down (and hence the risk-free interest
rate goes up) monotonically as the markets become more complete. We then used this
result to ﬁnd the range of bond prices in incomplete markets which depend only on the
primitives of the economy and not on market structures.
It was assumed throughout that the state space Ω is a ﬁnite set. This implies, among
other things, that both the expected utility and the expected marginal utility are ﬁnite.
If Ω is inﬁnite, then they may be inﬁnite and we may not be able to talk sensibly about
the preference ordering or ﬁrst-order conditions. A list of suﬃcient conditions for these to
be ﬁnite in terms of utility function and the underlying probability space can be found in
Nielsen (1993, Proposition 1 and 5). The case of special interest for CARA utility functions
is where asset payoﬀs and initial endowments are normally distributed, but it is covered by
his results.
An interesting aspect of the proof of our monotonicity result was to exploit the one-
to-one correspondence between the welfare improvements of equilibrium allocations and
changes in bond prices, owing to CARA utility functions. Since ﬁnancial innovations often
bring about welfare improvements, and since the changes in prices for existing assets are of
interest from both positive and normative viewpoints, it would be nice if we could generalize
this technique to a wider class of utility functions.
Finally, let us elaborate on the point that the solution (16) and (17) in Theorem 11 can
be regarded as a mutual fund theorem for a limited class of recursive utility functions. That
is, any increment in the risk-free consumptions on period 0 or the risky consumptions in
period 1 is shared by the individual agents according to the proportion (γ1/γ,...,γH/γ).









and thus the proportions of the consumption sharing are those of the risk tolerances 1/αh.
Our solution, however, diﬀers from Wilson’s in that the constant terms for xh
0 and xh need











































Thus the two constant terms would be equal if and only if δ1 = ··· = δH. The dif-
ference can therefore be accounted for by the heterogeneity of the subjective time dis-
count factors. In other words, if all agents have the same subjective time discount factor
(and Assumption 10 is satisﬁed), then the mutual fund theorem still holds in its original
form, so that ((xh
0,xh))h∈{1,...,H} is a Pareto-eﬃcient allocation if and only if there exists a
(η1,...,ηH) ∈ RH such that
H  
h=1







The representative agent’s utility function, on the other hand, does not exactly take the
expected utility function. Rather, it takes the recursive utility form, even when the δh may
diﬀer. This theorem thus provides a suﬃcient set of conditions under which the recursivity
of individual agents’ utility functions can be preserved under aggregation.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 9
Let ((xh
0,xh))h∈{1,...,H} be a corresponding consumption allocation of the equilibrium
risk-free bond price q1. Then, for every h,






Recall Remark 2: the minimizing probability distribution in the deﬁnition of EΠh
uh is not
aﬀected by adding any scalar multiple of 1, so
EΠh






















Take the log of both sides and divide by βh, then we obtain
1
βh logq1 − xh
0 =
1







Take the summation of both sides over h, then we obtain
1
β
















































Proof of Theorem 11.
Since the objective function is strictly concave and the constraint functions are linear,
it suﬃces to show that the given ((xh
0,xh))h∈{1,...,H} satisﬁes the ﬁrst order condition of the
maximization problem. It can be readily checked that the resource feasibility constraints








are independent of h, for all ω ∈ Ω.
20¿From (14), and from the deﬁnition of xh

































































which is independent of h.
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This can be seen to be independent of h as follows: The second and the third terms above


















21which is also independent of h. In conclusion, the weighted marginal utility is equalized at
any ω, as we wanted to show.



















































































the proof is completed.
Proof of Proposition 12
Apply the equality (8) for the risk-free bond price to the representative agent’s utility
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